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Abstract: Thisstudy investigatestheroleofgender inﬁnancial risk-taking. Speciﬁcally,
I ask whether female investors tend to fund less risky investment projects than males. To
answer this question, I use real-life investment data collected at the largest German market
for peer-to-peer lending. Investors’ utility is assumed to be a function of the projects ex-
pected return and its standard deviation, whereas standard deviation serves as a measure of
risk. Gender differences regarding the responses to projects’ risk are tested by estimating
a random parameter regression model that allows for variation of risk preferences across
investors. Estimation results provide no evidence of gender differences in investors’ risk
propensity: On average, male and female investors respond similarly to the changes in the
standard deviation of expected return. Moreover, no differences between male and female
investorsare foundwith respect to othercharacteristics ofprojects that mayserveas aproxy
for projects’ risk. Signiﬁcant gender differences in investors’ tastes are found only with re-
spect to preferred investment duration, purpose of investment project and borrowers’ age.
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11 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis of the early 21st Century triggered, among many other things, a heated
public debate about the role of gender in the ﬁnancial behavior of individuals.1 One con-
jecture voiced in the debate is that excessive risk-taking in the ﬁnancial markets is to be
blamed on the prevalence of males in the decision-making positions in the ﬁnancial indus-
try. As Neelie Kroes, the EU competition commissioner, put it: "... the collapse of Lehman
Brothers would never have happened if there’d been Lehman Sisters with them."2 Such
claims rely primarily on the popular gender stereotype that males seek greater risk and are
overconﬁdent in ﬁnancial matters than females. An important question is whether gender
stereotype reﬂects the true state of things. Does investor gender really affect risk-taking
propensity? The literature investigating this question is extensive, however, no conclusive
answer has been provided. So far, most evidence is based on household surveys or labora-
tory experiments. In contrast, direct evidence on real-life investment behavior is scarce and
essentially limited to studies of professional investors.
This study contributes to literature by examining ﬁnancial behavior of males and fe-
males using real-life data. The aim of the study is to test gender differences in the propen-
sity for risk taking by retail investors who participate in a new segment of ﬁnancial mar-
kets known as peer-to-peer (p2p) lending. Peer-to-peer lending means direct lending and
borrowing between individuals ("peers") without intermediation of a traditional ﬁnancial
institution like a bank. The data are collected from the largest German p2p marketplace
Smava.de. In this marketplace, individuals lend funds for a variety of purposes ranging
from large consumer expenditures to small business investments. The loans are neither
collateralized nor guaranteed and lenders can incur losses if borrowers default. Hence,
p2p-lenders can be seen as investors who fund risky projects.
Relying on the m-s approach, I assume that utility attached by investors to a risky
project depends on the project’s expected return m and its standard deviation s. The more
risk averse an investor is, the more his/her utility decreases in response to a small increase
in s. This relationship serves as a basis for the test of gender differences in risk propensity.
The aim of test is to answer the question: Are female investors participating in the German
p2p-lendingmorerisk-aversethanmaleinvestors? Iffemaleinvestorsindeedexhibithigher
risk aversion than male investors, their utility will decrease more than the utility of males
in response to a marginal increase in return’s standard deviation, ceteris paribus. Inference
about the effect of s on utility is derived from investors’ actual choices.
Advantages of using the p2p-lending data for the analysis are threefold. Firstly, all
participating investors are exposed to the same market-related factors: there is only one
type of ﬁnancial product, same investment rules apply for every one and all participants
have access to the same information. Therefore, it can be argued that differences in the
observed investment choices stem exclusively from investor-related factors. Secondly, a
complete history of investment choices of each participant including the characteristics
of the investment alternatives is observable. Thirdly, investors’ gender is observable to
researcher. All these features make p2p data well suited for a study of gender effects on the
propensity for risk-taking of retail investors.
1See e.g. Economist (2009), Bennhold (2009) and Oakeshott (2009)
2Indeed, all members of the executive management at Lehman Brothers at the time of the collapse were
male. The bank is not an exception: The three German banks – Deutsche Bank, Kommerzbank and Hy-
poVereinsbank – have all-male executive management teams.
2Estimationofinvestors’responsestotheriskinessofinvestmentprojectsrelies onmixed
logit regression – a qualitative choice model that accommodates repeated choice data. Re-
peated choice arises because during the observation period majority of investors conducted
more than one investment. This advantageous feature of the data eliminates problems stem-
ming from the fact that not all investor-speciﬁc factors are observable to researcher.
Results of regression analysis provide no evidence of gender differences in investors’
risk propensity: On average, male and female investors respond similarly to changes in
projects mean-variance proﬁle. Moreover, no differences between male and female in-
vestors are found with respect to other characteristics of investment projects that may serve
as proxy for projects’ riskiness. Signiﬁcant gender differences in investor taste are found
only with respect to preferred investment duration, purpose of investment project and bor-
rower age.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review studies ex-
amining the role of gender in individuals’ propensity for risk taking in ﬁnancial decisions.
Information about p2p-credit markets and lending mechanism at Smava.de is provided in
Section 3. In Section 4, I formulate the research hypothesis. Section 5 is devoted to empir-
ical analysis. Here, I ﬁrstly describe the econometric model and the data employed to test
the research hypothesis. Then, I report and discuss the main estimation results. The last
section concludes.
2 Literature Review
Academic research on the role of gender in the ﬁnancial behavior of individuals has a long
history. Nonetheless, the question regarding the effect of gender on the propensity for risk-
taking remains unanswered.
A large group of studies, especially those that analyze ﬁnancial behavior of individuals
in the population at large, suggest that females are on average more risk averse than males,
ceteris paribus, (Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Sunden and Surette, 1998; Bernasek and
Shwiff, 2001). However, thesestudiesrely on householdsurveydataprovidingonlygeneral
information about investments, while such important parameters as expected return, risk or
transaction costs are not known. Hence, the level of risk taken by an individual investor
cannot be measured exactly. Moreover, in the most survey-based data, ﬁnancial assets are
aggregated at household level making it difﬁcult to identify who is actually responsible for
an investment decision in a multi-person household.
A few empirical studies try to overcome these limitations by focusing on professionally
trained investors, mostly managers of investment funds, who take risky ﬁnancial decisions
in the course of their jobs. Intuition suggests that males and females who deliberately and
actively engage in risky ﬁnancial activity and have the same professional training should,
on average, exhibit similar risk propensity. This should hold even when in population at
large females are found to be less risk tolerant than males. Nonetheless, studies of behavior
of professional investors providemixedevidence. Johnson and Powell (1994) and Atkinson
et al. (2003) ﬁnd no differences in the behavior of male and female managers. In contrast,
Olsen and Cox (2001), Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) and Niessen and Ruenzi (2007)
show that female managers follow less risky investment styles than their male counterparts.
Noteworthy, the latter group of studies has one methodological feature in common. The
studied funds are very heterogenous ranging from pure bond-funds to pure equity-funds
so that the sampled individuals work in very different settings and face different invest-
3ment tasks. However, this may preclude unbiased evidence on individual-speciﬁc factors
of investment decisions.
So far, a careful control over the factors related to investment task could only be as-
sured in laboratory experiments. A number of experimental studies investigate gender dif-
ferences in risk preferences in objectiveprobability lotteries with both real and hypothetical
outcomes (Powell and Ansic, 1997; Schubert et al., 1999; Holt and Laury, 2002; Dohmen
et al., 2005; Fehr-Duda and Schubert, 2006; Eckel and Grossman, 2008).3 Although a
majority of the studies conﬁrm the gender stereotype, there are some notable exceptions.
For instance, Schubert et al. (1999) ﬁnd that risk propensity of males and females depends
strongly on whether experiments involve abstract gambles or contextually framed lotteries.
In the latter setting females and males do not exhibit signiﬁcant differences in risk propen-
sity. Interesting evidence is provided by Holt and Laury (2002) who show that the effect of
gender varies with the level of payoff. Females behave more risk averse than males when
lotteries involve low payoffs. However, when lotteries involve high payoffs, no differences
between males and females are documented. Thus, experimental evidence on gender dif-
ferences should be enjoyed carefully as gender differences in ﬁnancial behavior seems to
be sensitive to contextual framing and to the level of payoffs.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several important ways. First, it com-
plements experimental evidence by resolving the concerns regarding the consistency of be-
havior in a laboratory with behavior in real life. Furthermore, unlike most studies based on
observationaldata, the studyanalyzes risk-takingin a situationwhere all investorsmakede-
cisions about the sametype of investmentproduct. Finally, the study provides rare evidence
on the behavior of retail investors with detailed information about investments’ character-
istics available.
3 German Market for Peer-to-Peer Lending Smava
3.1 What is Peer-to-Peer Lending?
The term "peer-to-peer lending" refers to direct lending between private persons without
intermediation of traditional ﬁnancial institutions like banks. Classical examples of p2p
loans are loans granted among friends or family members. The novelty of the modern
p2p lending is the emergence of internet-based marketplaces (so called "platforms") where
funds are transferred from surplus and deﬁcit agents and the agents do not know each other
personally. The surplus agents, i.e. lenders, provide funds with interest. The deﬁcit agents,
i.e. borrowers, are contractually bound to repay the principal and the interest. They can,
however, default on their debt obligations and inﬂict losses on lenders.
The ﬁrst p2p platform, Zopa, was founded in 2005 in the UK. Since then, more than 30
independent market places started in the USA and continental Europe. Currently, the total
amount of p2p loans originated by the largest platforms in the USA and Europe – Prosper,
Lending Club, Zopa, Smava and Auxmoney – amounts to e600 million.4 Compared to the
volume of the traditional consumer credit market, peer-to-peer lending is still a niche prod-
3A concise overview of these studies is provided by Croson and Gneezy (2009).
4Own calculations of the author based on ofﬁcial reports of the four platforms.
4uct. Nevertheless, its phenomenon attracts signiﬁcant attention of general public, ﬁnancial
industry professionals and academics.5
3.2 How does Smava function?
This study focuses on the largest German p2p platform Smava.de. The platform was
launched in March 2007. By the end of March 2010, a total of 4,148 loan applications
were posted on the platform. This leads to a total volume of ca. e 25 million, the result of
3,354 signed loan contracts (Figure 3)6 The average amount of loan is approximately e 8
thousand.
The market functions in the following way. Individuals who want to invest or borrow
on the platform must register and prove their identity. Investing is allowed to private indi-
viduals who are at least 18 years old and residents of Germany. Borrowing is allowed to
private persons who comply with a range of requirements. First, applicants must be at least
18 years old and have a monthly income of at least e 1,000. Secondly, only those whose
individual ﬁnancial burden does not exceed 67 % are eligible to borrow at the platform.
Financial burden is measured as a ratio of monthly payments on all outstanding consumer
debts (including loans taken at Smava) to the borrower’s personal monthly disposable in-
come. Mortgage payments are treated as expenditures and subtracted from the disposable
income. Income by other household members, as well as household savings, are not taken
into account. Depending on the obtained ratio, borrowers are rated on a scale from 1 to
4 and assigned the so called KDF-indicator as described in Table 2. Finally, the platform
accepts only applicants with credit scores ranging from A to H. This rating, commonly re-
ferred to as a "Schufa-rating", is assigned to individuals by Schufa, the German national
credit bureau, and measures individual’s creditworthiness on a 12-point scale from A (the
best) to M (the worst). Each rating score corresponds to an estimate of probability that
a borrower defaults on his obligations (see Table 3). Applicants’ identity is veriﬁed via
postident procedure, a procedure through which individuals prove their identity through
veriﬁcation procedures carried out by employees of Deutsche Post at their local post ofﬁce.
The veriﬁed identity is not revealed to other market participants; instead both investors and
borrowers operate at the platform under usernames.
After successful registration, borrowers post loan applications on the platform’s web
page. A loan application speciﬁes the amount of money the applicant wants to borrow, for
how long and what nominal annual interest rate he or she is willing to pay. Two restric-
tions are imposed by the platform on loan applications: the requested loan amount must be
between e 500 and e 50,000; and the loan duration must be either 36 or 60 months. In
addition, applicants may provide a description of the loan purpose, of their own personality
and upload a picture. These additional pieces of information are provided voluntarily and
are not veriﬁed by the platform.
Investors can browse through the applications and choose which borrower they want
to ﬁnance. When an investor decides to provide funds to a particular borrower, he or she
submits an electronic order. By submitting the order an investor "signs" a binding contract
in which he/she commits to provide certain amount of money to the chosen borrower. The
5For the general information see e.g. FTD (2009), Sviokla (2009) and Kim (2009); on ﬁnancial industry
analysis see Meyer (2009); and on academic research see Pope and Sydnor (2008), Freedman and Jin (2008),
Garman et al. (2008) and Duarte et al. (2009).
6Own calculations of the author.
5minimum acceptable order is e 250, the maximum is e 25,000. All orders must be mul-
tiples of 250. Often several investors submit offers to the same loan and each provides a
fraction of the amount requested in the application. The number of investors tends to in-
crease with the size of requested loan. So far, the average number of investors per loan was
15 and the median order is e 250.
An important distinguishing feature of Smava.de is that loans are not auctioned. In
contrast to many other peer-to-peer lending sites, orders at this platform are accepted on
the "ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served" basis, i.e. until the requested loan amount is covered to 100%.
Investors cannot underbid offers from other investors by offering money at a lower interest
rate. Money can only be provided under the terms speciﬁed in loan applications, i.e. under
the interest rate and for the duration set by applicants.
Each application remains open for orders during 14 days, starting with the day when
it was posted. If after this period less than 25% of the requested amount is raised, the
application is canceled and the raised money (if any raised) is returned to investors.7 The
applicant can post the applicationagain, eventually, offering more attractiveconditions, e.g.
a higher interest rate. In case of a successful brokerage, the platform charges investors with
e 4 per order. Borrowers’ fee depends on loan maturity and is 2 % of the borrowed sum
(or at least e 40) when the loan is due in 36 months and 2.5 % of the borrowed sum (or at
least e 60) if the loan matures in 60 months.8
Loans procured at the platform are installmentcredits that are not collateralized or guar-
anteed by third parties. Borrowers are only contractually bound to repay the debt and the
interest in ﬁxed monthly payments. To safeguard the investors from total loss, the platform
utilizes two risk-reducing instruments. These instruments are described in more detail in
the following sections of the paper.
3.3 What Information Do Investors Have?
Investingat the platformis characterized by substantialinformationalasymmetries between
investors and borrowers. The asymmetries emerge mainly because borrowers’ identity is
not known and investors are provided with a limited set of information about the borrowers.
Investors have access only to information that is collected and disclosed by the platform.
Hence, ultimately the decisions of investors are built upon the provided information set.
Loan speciﬁc information observable to investors comprises the following details. In-
vestors can observe in real time when a loan request is posted, what bids are submitted
by the other investors (if any), when the submissions were made, and what share of the re-
quested sum remains unfunded. Investors can also see the loan conditions set by borrowers:
nominal annual interest rate, loan amount and maturity. Further, borrowers have to specify
the purpose of loan by choosing an item from a menu of 17 categories. Figure 4 plots the
distribution of applications over the categories. In addition to specifying the loan purpose,
borrowers can also provide a relatively detailed description of the projects they need money
for. This additional information should increase borrowers’ trustworthiness and reduce in-
formational asymmetries between the parties. However, the description of loan purpose is
voluntarily and is not always provided.
7About 8% of loan applications in the data set did not raise any money; 5% raised less than 25% of
requested amount; 6% raised ≥ 25% but less than 100%; 81% managed to raise 100% of requested amount.
8Smava changedthe terms of the platformseveral times, but no changes were made duringthe time period
under observation.
6The borrower-speciﬁc information observed by investors can be subdivided into "hard"
and "soft" information. Hard information includes veriﬁed data that each borrower is
obligedto provide. Thedata set comprisesborrowers’age, sex, employmentstatus, place of
residence, credit rating, debt burden measured as debt-to-income ratio, number of delayed
payments and defaults on previous Smava loans. Availability of hard information is crucial
for investors, because it allows them to estimate the expected rate of return on investments
and the probability of the borrower defaulting.
Although all pieces of hard information are veriﬁed, informational imperfections are
still high. In particular, the platform provides only a rough estimate of borrowers’ personal
ﬁnancial burden. The actual income and savings are not observable. Furthermore, nothing
is known about the income and wealth of other household members. The available "hard"
information is complemented by "soft" information. The latter is voluntarily provided by
borrowers and is not veriﬁable. The "soft" data may include information on borrowers’
education, hobbies, family status etc.
3.4 What Risks Do Investors Face?
Loans procured at the platform are neither secured by collateral nor guaranteed by third
parties. Hence, investors can incur a loss if borrowers default on their obligations. To
prevent total losses, the platform uses two instruments. Firstly, in case of default the claim
to outstanding debt is sold to a collecting agency. Between 15 and 20 percent of invested
capital can be recovered in this way. Secondly, a signiﬁcantly larger part of capital can be
recovered due to a risk sharing mechanism via loan pools.
Risk sharing via pools is accomplished by assigning investors into groups. Speciﬁcally,
all investors who ﬁnance loans of the same duration and rating are assigned into one group.
For example, all investors who granted loans to borrowers with rating "A" for 60 months
belong to the same pool. Due to existence of 8 rating classes and 2 durations, there are
16 pools in total. Monthly redemption payments done by borrowers of the same pool are
lumped together and each investor gets an amount proportional to his/her investment. In-
terest payments are not pooled together but transferred directly to investors. When some
loans from the pool default, the losses are subtracted from the pool and the remainder is
then divided among all members of the pool proportionally to their investments. In effect,
all members of the pool including those who actually invested in the defaulted loan get a
fraction of the usual monthly payment. This faction is called the pool’s payment rate. For,
example there are 100 investors in a pool and each granted a e 250-loan to different bor-
rowers. If two loans get default, the pool’s payment rate reduces to 98% which means that
every member of the pool gets only 98% of the stipulated redemption payment. If another
loan defaults, the pool’s payment rate decreases to 97% and so on. The payment rate can,
however, be improved when members of a pool invest in new loans of the same duration
and rating and the old defaulted loans reach their maturity. The platform provides investors
with a prediction of average payment rate for each pool (see Table 4). The described risk
sharing mechanism assures that affected investors do not lose 100% of the invested capital.
The ﬂip side of the coin is that the losses are covered by withholding a part of cash inﬂows
from the unaffected investors and, hence, reducing their proﬁts.
Loans that are repaid prior to maturity present another source of risk. When a loan is
repaid early, investors loose a part of expected interest payments. There is no penalty for
early paymentsand hence investorsget no compensationfor theforegoneinterest. A further
source of risk is associated with delayed payments. A delayed payment ties up the money
7and prevents investors from reinvesting it in new projects. Because no penalty for delayed
payments is imposed on borrowers, lenders are not compensated for postponed reinvesting.
Hence, delayed payments inﬂict losses in the form of foregone investment opportunities.
4 Research Hypothesis
The goal of the paper is to answer the question: Do females investing in p2p loans exhibit
higher risk aversion than males? To answer this question, I analyze the choices of male and
female investors.
At the considered market, the set of investment alternatives faced by investors is com-
prised of loans requested by loan applicants. In the following, I refer to loans as investment
projects. Aninvestorranks his/herpreferences overall availableinvestmentproject depend-
ing on how much utility he/she expects to obtain from each project. Speciﬁcally, I assume
that investors have a two-parameter utility function U(m,s). That is, utility attached by
an investor to a project depends on a linear combination of the project’s expected return m
and its standard deviation s. Thus, investors rank their preferences over different projects
depending on the utility expected from them. If investors are rational, they choose to fund
projects yielding the greatest utility. Hence, investor decision problem can be speciﬁed as
choosing the projects with such combination of m and s that maximizes investor utility.
Under these assumptions, investors’ propensity for risk-taking can be measured relying
on the m-s approach. 9 The intuition behind the m-s approach is that investors trade-off
between the expected return and its standard deviation whereas the latter represents risk.
Investors like return and place a positiveweight on m so thatU( ) increases in m. Investors’
attitude towards s depends on the investors’ individual risk preferences. Let g denote a
constant reﬂecting investors’ risk preferences. Risk preferences can be explicitly included
into investors’ utility function: U(m,gs). Then the marginal effect of s on the utility
is given by g and varies across investors with different risk preferences. Speciﬁcally, if
investors are risk-averse, g is negative and U( ) decreases in s. Moreover, the larger the
weight the larger the decrease in the utility. For risk-neutral investors, g is zero and U( )
does not vary with s. For risk-loving investors, g is positive, so that U( ) increases in s
and the larger the g the larger the increase.
This relationship between risk preferences and the marginal effect of s on the utility,
provides the basis for the test of differences in risk preferences between male and female
investors. Speciﬁcally, if females investing on the considered platform are on average more
risk averse (or less risk loving) than males, then g should systematically differ between
males and females, ceteris paribus. Let gm and gf denote respectively the risk preferences
of male and female investors. Different risk preferences of males and females mean that
gm  = gf. To see what implications does this difference have, consider the following ﬁve
situations:
9m-s approach is frequently criticized for its restrictive assumptions regarding the functional form of
utility (Meyer, 1987; Bigelow, 1993) or distribution of returns (Chamberlain, 1983). However, in contrast to
situations where mixtures of distributions are considered, in situations where preferences are to be ordered
over a set of simple distributions (as is the case in this study), m-s approach can be employed under less
restrictive assumptions (Meyer and Rasche, 1992).
Another restrictive property of m-s approach is its assumption that investors derive utility only from mon-
etary payoffs of investment projects. However, recent studies show that individuals attach signiﬁcant value to
social returns of an investment (see e.g. Bollen, 2007; Benson and Humphrey, 2008). This circumstance is
accounted for in the empirical part of the paper.
8Situation 1. Both male and female investors are on average risk averse, whereas fe-
males are on average more risk averse than males: gm, gf < 0 and |gm| < |gf|. Then, an
increase in s has a negativeeffect on the utility of both gender groups. However, the utility
of females decreases more than the utilityof males when s increases. Hence, the difference













Situation 2. Female investors are on average risk averse, whereas males are on average
risk neutral: gf < 0, gm = 0. Then, an increase in s has a negative effect on the utility of
female investors but no effect on the utility of male investors. Respectively, the difference













Situation 3. Female investors are on average risk neutral, whereas males are on average
risk loving: gf = 0, gm > 0. Then, an increase in s has no effect on the utility of female in-
vestors but has a positiveeffect on the utility of male investors. Respectively, the difference













Situation 4. Both male and female investors are on average risk loving, whereas fe-
males are on average less risk loving than males: 0 < gf < gm. Then, an increase in s
has a positive effect on the utility of both gender groups. However, the utility of females
increases less than the utility of males. Hence, the difference between the marginal effects














Situation 5. Female investors are on average risk averse, whereas males are on average
risk loving: gf < 0, gm > 0. Then, an increase in s has a negative effect on the utility
of female investors but a positive effect on the utility of male investors. Respectively, the













Thus, difference between the marginal effects of s on the utility of females and males
is negative in any situation where females are either more risk averse or less risk loving
than males. Similarly it can be shown that the marginal effect of s on utility is the same for
both genders when males and females are, on average, equally risk prone. Furthermore, the
difference in the marginal effects between males and females is positive when females are
more risk prone than males. So, to answer the research question whether females investing
in the considered market are on average more risk averse (or less risk loving) than males,
the following hypothesis has to be tested:
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, the difference between the marginal effect of s on the








9Hence, gender differences in risk propensity can be tested by estimating the marginal
effect of one standard deviation of a project’s expected return on the utility of investors.
Inference about the utility attached by investors to different projects can made based on the
observed investment choices. The empirical test is described in the remainder of the paper.
5 Implementation of the Test
5.1 Econometric Model
Let Jt
n denote the set of investment alternatives faced by investor n in choice situation t ∈
Tn. Jt
n comprises all investment projects that are available at the market at time t, when
investor n submits his/her order on one of the projects. The utility that investorn attaches to
investmentproject j ∈Jt
n can be decomposed in a deterministicpart b b b
′
nxnjt which is a linear
combination of the project’s characteristics observable to researcher and an unobserved
part, enjt:
Unjt = b b b
′
nxnjt +enjt, (1)
where xnjt is a K-dimensional vector of the characteristics of investment project j. The
main characteristics of a project are the expected return and its standard deviation. Besides
them, each project is characterized by a number attributes summarized in Table 6. b b bn is a
vector of parameters reﬂecting investor’s n valuation of (or taste for) each attribute k ∈ K.
enjt is a stochastic term representing the random part of utility; it is iid over investors
and choice situations. It is assumed that investor preference is completely deﬁned by the
projects’ attributes, that is, utility is derived from the attributes associated with investment
projects rather than from projects per se. In line with this assumption, Equation 1 has no
alternative-speciﬁc constants.
Vector b b bn is explicitly allowed to vary over individuals. I assume that b b bn is normally
distributed with mean b b b and standard deviation s s sb: b b bn ∼ N(b b b,s s sb).10 This feature reﬂects
the possibility that there is taste variation in the population and any given attribute of an
investment project may receive different valuation from different investors. For example,
utility derived from an investment project with a given expected return and standard devia-
tionshouldvary overindividualsdependingon theirriskpreferences. However,preferences
are not observed. Therefore, the model should accommodate random taste heterogeneity
emerging due to unobserved investor-speciﬁc factors. Furthermore, a part of taste variation
may also stem from observable differences among individuals such as, for example, age,
income or gender. This kind of taste heterogeneity is systematic and can be explicitly mod-
eled by taking investors’ characteristics into account. Due to the research aim of this paper,
I only focus on how valuation of projects’ attributes depends on investor gender.
The two types of taste heterogeneity – random and systematic – are incorporated into
Equation 1 by expressing vector b b bn as a function of investors’ gender and the unobserved
individual-speciﬁc effects:
b b bn = b b b+g g gFemalenjt +h h hn,
where vector b b b has k-elements each representing the average valuation placed by male
investors on project attribute k ∈ K. Femalenjt is a dummy variable equal 1 if investor is
female and 0 if male.
10I assume that coefﬁcients of correspondingto different projects’ attributes are not correlated. That is, the
off-diagonal elements of matrix s s s2
b are zero.
10Vector g g g has K-elements each capturing the difference between the average effect of
project attribute k on the utility of a female investor and the marginal effect of project
attribute k on the utility a male investor. For instance, gSD[Return] is one of the elements of
g g g that shows the difference between the effect of returns’ standard deviation on the utility
of females and the effect on the utility of males. With respect to the research hypothesis,
gSD[Return] is of central interest. A negative and statistically signiﬁcant estimate \ gSD[Return]
means that females are more risk averse (or less risk tolerant) than males.
h h hn is a K-dimensional vector with elements represents the effect of unobserved factors
associated with investor n on his/her valuation of the project’s attributes. Technically, h h hn is
a deviation of bn from its mean: h h hn =b b bn−b b b. Therefore, it is by construction normally dis-
tributed with zero mean and standard deviation s s sb. h h hn is allowed to vary across investors
but is assumed to be constant over choice situations for a given investor.
After speciﬁcation of taste heterogeneity, Equation 1 can be rewritten as
Unjt = b b b
′xnjt +g g gFemalenjtxnjt +h h hnxnjt +enjt. (2)
Now, the random portion of utility consists of h h h′
nxnjt +enjt. Due to the common effect of
h h hn, the random term is correlated over investment alternatives and choice situations for a
given investor.
So far, the equation describing investor choice is speciﬁed so that expected utility en-
tered the equation as a dependent variable. Yet, expected utility of an investor is his/her
private information that is not observable to a researcher. What is observed is the choice
set faced by an investor and the actual choice made. Assuming that investors are utility
maximizers, it can be argued that the chosen project provides an investor with the great-
est expected utility. Therefore, inference about factors affecting an investor’s utility can be
made by analyzing the relationship between observable attributes of investmentalternatives
and the investor’s choice. Such analysis can be done by estimating a discrete choice model
(Train, 2009).
Consider a data set where unit of observation is an investment project. Each time an
investor makes an investment, he/she contributes Nnt = Jt
n observations to the data set,
whereby Jt
n is the number of projects entering the choice set of investor n in choice sit-
uation t. Now, deﬁne a new binary variable ynjt as follows
ynjt
 
= 1 if project j is chosen by investor n in situation t
= 0 if project j is not chosen
The probability that investor n chooses project j in choice situation t given projects’ at-
tributes is
Pr[ynjt = 1] = Pr[Unjt >Unit, ∀ j  = i]
Brownstone and Train (1998) show that in the case when coefﬁcient vector b b bn entering the
utility equation is randomly distributed with parameters b b b and s s sb, the choice probability
becomes
Pr[ynjt = 1] =
 
Lnjt(b b bn)f(b b bn|b b b, s s sb))d(b b bn)
where Lnjt(b b bn) is given by a standard logit:
Lnjt =
exp(b b b′xnjt+g g gFemalenjtxnjt+h h hnxnjt)
åiexp(b b b′xnit+g g gFemalenjtxnit+h h hnxnit)
11Revelt and Train (1998) extend the model to situation where researcher observes repeated
choices for a given decision-maker. Speciﬁcally, they show that the probability of a se-
quence of choices made by an individual is given by
Pr[ynj = 1] =
 
Õ
t Lnjt(b b bn)f(b b bn|b b b, s s sb))d(b b bn) (3)
Models of this form are known in the literature as mixed logit (Train, 2009). As shown
by McFadden and Train (2000) mixed logit models present a very ﬂexible type of discrete
choice models that allows efﬁcient estimation of the parameters b b b and s s sb by means of
maximum simulated likelihood.11
5.2 The Data Set
Data used to estimate Model 3 are collected from the publicly available electronic archives
of Smava.de. The data set contains observations on the electronic orders submitted by
investors between March 2007 and March 2010. The number of investors registered at the
end of observation period was 5,671. The total number of submitted orders is 54,455. On
average, each investor submitted 10 orders, meaning that on average each investor made
a choice in 10 choice situations (the median is 4, the maximum is 292). In each choice
situation, investorsfaced an average of17 different investmentprojects (the median number
of alternatives is 13, minimum is 1 and maximum is 84). Figure 8 plots the distribution of
choice sets over the number of alternatives entering them.
The majority of investors participating on the platform are male. There are only 625 fe-
male investors, 11% of all registered investors.12 Summary statistics in Table 5 reveal some
differences in the proﬁles of male and female investors. Males started investing at the p2p
market 1 monthearlierthan females and hencecan besaid tobesomewhatexperienced than
females. Female investors are, on average, 4 years older than male investors. The average
amount invested per loan and the total amount invested at the platform by female investors
is somewhat smaller than the respective amounts invested by male investors. However, the
difference is statistically not signiﬁcant.
For each submitted order the data includes information about the chosen loan applica-
tion and the other applications entering the choice set of each investor. Attributes of loan
applications that enter vector xnjt in Equation 2 are captured in the following variables.
Amount is a continuous variable showing how much money a borrower requested in the
application. Since the amount is always a multiple of 250 the variable is scaled by fac-
tor 1
250 when used in regression analysis. Duration is a dummy variable equal 1 if loan is
11Comparedto otherdiscrete choicemodelssuch as multinomiallogit orprobitmodels, mixedlogit models
exhibit a number of useful properties. For instance, in contrast to mulninomial logit, mixed logit accommo-
dates temporal correlation in error terms and relaxes the restrictive property of independence from irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) (Train, 2009). Vis-a-vis multinomial probit model estimation of mixed logit is computa-
tionally less demanding. Numerical methods of integration currently used for probit models (for instance,
Gaussian quadrature) operate effectively only when the number of alternatives times the number of choice
situations is no more than four or ﬁve (Train, 2009). Yet, the dimension of the data in hand is much higher.
The number of choice situations alone amounts on average to 84, while the number of alternatives in a choice
set is on average 17.
12The predominance of male investors at the platform suggests that some kind of self-selection is taking
place. Unfortunately, the data do not allow modeling the selection mechanism and to identify what factors
determine the participation decision. Previous research shows that women are usually under-represented
in the ﬁnancial markets. For instance, only 10% of managers in the investment fund industry are females
(Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008; Niessen and Ruenzi, 2007). Moreover, considering the ﬁnancial markets at
large, females are found to be less likely to invest in risky ﬁnancial assets (Badunenko et al., 2009).
12asked for 60 month and 0 if for 36 months. Offered interest rate is a continuous variable
describing showing the nominal annual interest rate in % offered by a borrower. Purpose
is a dummy variable equal 1 if a loan is taken for business purposes and 0 if for consumer
purpose. Description is a continuous variable measuring the length of description of loan
made by a borrower. This variable is equal to a logarithm of the number of characters used
in the description. Female is a dummy variable describing borrowers’ gender. It is equal 1
borrower is female and 0 if male. Age is a continuous variable showing the age of borrower
when he/she posted the application. Variable Rating takes on 8 values from "A" (the best
creditworthiness) to H (the worst creditworthiness) and measures the creditworthiness of
borrowers according to the scale of the German credit agency, Schufa. Dummy variable
Financial burden: low is equal 1 if borrower’s debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 20%.
Dummy variable Financial burden: moderate equals 1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within
the range 20-40% and 0 otherwise. Dummy variable Financial burden: substantial equals
1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within the range 40-60%. Dummy variable Financial bur-
den: high equals 1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within the range 60-67%. Employment is
a dummy variable indicating borrowers’ employment status. It is equal 1 if borrower is
self-employed, and 0 if borrower is either employed or retired.
Information about projects’ expected return and variance of returns is not provided to
either investors or researchers. Both must calculate these attributes individually. Calcula-
tion of expected return and its standard deviation, as applied in this study, is described in
the next section.
5.3 Calculation of expected return and its variance
Assuming that the uncertainty pertaining to the payoff of an annuity loan stems only from
the probability that a borrower defaults,13 then investing in an annuity loan can be seen as
buying a lottery with M+1 possible outcomes where M equals to the number of monthly
installments that a borrower is contractually obliged to pay in order to repay the loan. De-
pending on when a borrower defaults, the number of actually paid installments can vary
between 0 (no payments made) and M (all payments completed). Realization of any of
M +1 outcomes determines what rate of return to investment is obtained. The rate of re-
turn, conditional on realization of an outcome, is denoted by Rm.
Probability of each outcome of the lottery is determined by the probability that a bor-
rower defaults and does not pay back a number of installments. Let T = {1,2,...,M} be a
discrete random variable indicating the sequential number of installment at which a default
occurred, i.e. neither the installment in question nor any of the subsequent installments are
paid. Let f(t) denote the probability distribution function of T. Then, probability of de-
fault occurring with installment t is Pr(T =t)= f(t). The probability distribution function
f(t) is not known. However, it can be estimated based on the payment behavior of borrow-
ers observed in the past. In particular, it is helpful to estimate how probability of default
with any given installment depends on the observable characteristics of borrowers and loan
terms. Procedure used to estimate the probabilities is described in Appendix A. Based on
estimated default probabilities, one obtains estimates of the probability of each outcome for
any given loan, ˆ p1,..., ˆ pM+1.
13There are other sources of uncertainty such as the probability of early repayment of a loan or changes in
the payment rates of pools. However, the present analysis does not take these into account.
13Figure 5 illustrates the possible outcomes and the respective probabilities for a loan
with duration 36 months. The duration of 36 months implies that 36 a borrower must pay
36 installments. Respectively, there are 37 possible outcomes. Let R1 denote the rate of
return received by investor if the ﬁrst outcome is realized. The ﬁrst outcome is realized if
borrower does not pay any installments. The probability of this outcome, p1, is the proba-
bility that default occurs with the ﬁrst installment, Pr(T = 1) = f(2). The second outcome
is realized if borrower pays the ﬁrst installment but defaults with the second installment.
This outcome occurs with probability p2 = Pr(T = 2) = f(2). And so on. Finally, the last
possible outcome emerges if borrower makes all payments, i.e. does not default on any of
the installments. The probability of this event p37 = Pr(T ≥ 36) = 1− f(36).
The next step is to determine the rate of return, Rm, generated in case of each outcome.
Return to an annuity loan can be determined by calculating the internal rate of return from
a series of cash ﬂows produced by the loan. Similar to a common annuity loan, cash ﬂow
generated by a Smava-loan is given by a series of monthly installments paid by borrowers
whereby each installment consists of debt redemption and interest on the outstanding debt.
With Smava loans, even in case of a borrower default, investors receive some money back
due to the collective insurance mechanism described in Section 3. Investors always get a
fractionofthecontractuallystipulatedredemptionregardlessofwhetheraborrowerdefaults
or not. This fraction is determined by the payment rate of the pool the investor belongs to,
Pp.14 Interest is exempt from the insurance mechanism, such that investors do not get any
of the contractually stipulated interest if their borrowers default.
Hence, amount At received by an investor at the t-th month of a loan duration is
At =
 
Pp×Dt +It, ∀t < T
Pp×Dt, ∀ t ≥ T.
where Dt is the value of contractually stipulated redemption in montht, Pp is the repayment
rate of pool p where investor belongs to, It is the contractually stipulated interest in month
t, and T is the installment at which a default occurred.




















(1+r)t , if m = M+1
where Investment is the amount invested in the loan by a particular investor and Fee is the
ﬁxed fee charged by the platform for each investment.15
14In reality, payment rate of each pool varies depending on how many loans in the pool default in a given
month. However, because at the moment of investment investors do not know the future rates, they have to
rely on some assumptions regarding the process. In my calculations, I make a simplifying assumption that
payment rate remains constant at the level as predicted by the platform. See Table 4.
15Presence of a ﬁxed fee implies that the return depends on the investment amount. However, because the
fee is very small relative to the minimal possible order, the effect should be negligible. So the calculations
are done assuming that each investor allocates the minimal possible amount of 250 Euro per loan. Then, it
is sufﬁcient to calculate the return for (only) 3,354 loan applications instead of all 54,455 investments done
at the platform. Because calculation of return involves computationally intensive optimization procedure,
reducing the number of cases is crucial.
14The expected return from a loan is given by a weighted sum of returns associated with






Figure 6 plots the distribution of annualized E[Return] over all investment projects posted
on the market. The sample mean of annualized E[Return] is 6.8%.








Figure 7 plots the calculated SD[Return] against E[Return] for all investment projects
posted on the market. The calculated SD[Return] and E[Return] are further used as ex-
planatory variables entering vector xnjt in Equation 2.
5.4 Estimation Results
Results of the estimation of Model 3 are reported in Table 7. Note that there are three
different blocks of estimated parameters: ˆ b b b, ˆ s s sb and ˆ g g g. ˆ b b b is an estimate of the vector
of random coefﬁcients b b bn; it represents the average effect of respective variables on the
expected utility of male investors. ˆ s s sb is the estimated standard deviation of b b bn reﬂecting
the variation of tastes among investors. The estimate ˆ g g g is the parameter of primary interest;
it shows how the average effect of variables on the utility of female investors differs from
the effect of these variables on the utility of male investors.
Results reported under the header "S1" are obtained for a reduced speciﬁcation of the
vector of random parameters b b bn and the vector of explanatory variables xnjt. Speciﬁcally,
b b bn =b b b+h h hn whilexnjt includes only two variables E[Return]and SD[Return]. This speciﬁ-
cation does not take intoaccount investors’gender. However, it allowsseeing how investors
respond to projects’ expected return and variation. The estimate of the mean of the coefﬁ-
cient for E[Return] is 0.79 and is statistically signiﬁcant implying that expected utility of a
project increases with E[Return], holding other characteristics of the project constant. The
estimate of the standard deviation of the coefﬁcient for E[Return] is 0.528 and is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. This means that there is considerable variation in investors’ responses to
the level of projects’ return. For a small fraction of investors the coefﬁcient is even nega-
tive.16 This result does not necessarily imply that investors dislike higher returns. Rather it
signals that a fraction of investors rely on a decision rule different from the mean-variance
principle. Moreover, in the context of peer-to-peer lending, investors may derive signiﬁcant
utility from social returns stemming from awareness that invested money will be used for a
socially useful project or help another person out in a difﬁcult situation. Respectively, indi-
viduals may engage more willingly in less proﬁtable projects if such projects are associated
with substantial social returns.
The estimate of the mean of the coefﬁcient for SD[Return] is negative (-0.267) and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant, which indicates that on average investors dislike variation in returns.
16This inference is derived from the properties of normal distribution. Because coefﬁcients are assumed to
be normally distributed, 68% of investors fall within the range between −s and +s; 95% of investors fall
within the range between −2s and +2s; and 99% of investors fall within the range between −3s and +3s
15The probability of investing in a project decreases in response to a marginal increase in re-
turn’svariation. Hence, themajorityofinvestorsonthep2pplatformseem toberisk-averse.
The estimate of the standard deviation of the coefﬁcient for SD[Return] is statistically sig-
niﬁcant meaning that preferences for returns’ variance vary in the population. Moreover,
the magnitude of the standard deviation implies that for a considerable number of investors
higher variation in returns is associated with higher expected utility. Again, this result may
emerge because not all investors consider mean-variance rule as a criterion for investment
choice. Or, alternatively, the ﬁnding may indicate that a portion of investors are risk-loving.
Results reported under the header "S2" are obtained for the same speciﬁcation of b as
before, but this time vector xnjt is extended by including other observable characteristics
of loan projects. Previously received results for the effects of E[Return] and SD[Return]
remain basically unchanged: Utility of investors is positively related to investments’ return
and negatively related to the variation of return. However, the magnitude of the estimates
of the means of the two coefﬁcients decreased compared to results for the baseline speciﬁ-
cation. Because of the way the expected return and its variance are calculated in the study,
they depend on the attributes of the projects. When the attributes are additionally included
in the regression equation together with E[Return] and SD[Return], it can lead to multi-
collinearity and respectively reduce the signiﬁcance ascribed to E[Return] and SD[Return].
Moreover, the fact that all considered attributes have signiﬁcant effect on investors’ utility
indicates that investors attach signiﬁcant value to the attributes in addition to the impact
these factors have on return and its variation. For example, the coefﬁcient estimate for the
dummy variable Loan duration=60 months is -1.067 meaning that investors prefer short
term loans over long term loans. Even when investors realize that, ceteris paribus, return is
negatively linked to loan duration they may attach additional negative value to long dura-
tions simply because they dislike it when their money is tied up for a long time.
Finally, results under the header "S3" relate to an extended speciﬁcation when b b bn =
b b b+g g gFemaleijt +h h hn. This speciﬁcation allows the effect of projects’ attributes to vary with
investors’gender. The main parameters of interest are reported in the lower part of the table
under ˆ g g g. Coefﬁcient estimates for E[Return] and SD[Return] are statistically insigniﬁcant
meaning that the effect of one standard deviation of project’s return on utility of female
investors is not different from the effect on utility of male investors. Hence, contrary to the
research hypothesis, a marginal increase in returns variability reduces the utility of a female
investor as much as it reduces the utility of a male investor. Also borrowers’ rating and
ﬁnancial burden – the two characteristics that might be considered by investors as a rough
proxy for investments’ riskiness – has the same effect for females as for males. Therefore,
the results do not conﬁrm that gender has an effect on investor risk taking propensity.
However, some signiﬁcant gender differences in investor tastes are found with respect
to other attributes of investment projects. For instance, females seem to dislike long-term
loans more than males. Unlike males, females prefer consumer loans over business loans.
The only borrower-speciﬁc characteristic where female investors seem to have different
tastes than males is borrower age: Utility derived by females increases with borrower age.
However, this result may be driven by the fact that female investors participating at Smava
are, on average, somewhat older than male investors. Noteworthy, the effect of borrowers’
gender does not vary with investors’ gender. Hence, both male and female investors are
more willing to provide funds to female borrowers than to male borrowers.
166 Conclusions
This paper examines the role of investor gender in their propensity for risk taking when
investing on an online p2p credit market. A p2p market serves as a channel though which
investors directly allocate capital to investment projects without intermediation of a ﬁnan-
cial institution or advisor. Because payoffs from loans are uncertain, p2p loans can be seen
as a form of risky investment. Investors’ choices allow making inference about their risk
preferences.
A comparison of investment choices of male and female investors participating in p2p-
lending does not reveal any signiﬁcant differences with respect to their risk propensity.
Relying on the mean-variance framework, I test whether female investors respond to in-
creasing variance in expected returns differently than male investors. The results of a test
show that gender does not matter for investors’ risk preferences. A marginal increase in
the standard deviation of expected return equally affects the utility of males and females.
Moreover, no differences between male and female investorsare found with respect to other
characteristics of projects that may serve as proxy for projects’ riskiness. Hence, the data
on peer-to-peer lending do not support the conjecture that women tend to take less risks in
investment decisions than their male counterparts.
However, the results should be enjoyed with caution because low participation of fe-
males in the market indicates self-selection. If probability of investing at the market is
correlated with individual risk-propensity, then obtained results cannot be generalized to
the overall population. Nevertheless, the study provides useful evidence on the behavior of
individuals who are likely to self-select into risk-taking activities. A conclusion that can
be derived from this perspective is that gender seems to play no role in the behavior of
individuals who deliberately engage in risk-taking. Hence, the results are consistent with
studies showing that, among professionally trained investors, females behave similarly to
males with respect to risk (Johnson and Powell, 1994; Atkinson et al., 2003). The present
study supports and extends this literature by showing that this relationship holds also in
self-selected groups of not-trained retail investors.
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19Appendix A: Estimation of the probability of default
Probability of default in a given month of a loan’s duration is estimated using the observed
payment behavior of borrowers at Smava. Information about borrowers’ payment behavior
is collected from http://www.beobach.de/. Repayment history is observed through the end
of December 2010. Figure 1 plots distribution of defaults by the month of default observed
in the data. Since the market is young, many credits have not matured yet. Speciﬁcally,
of 3,354 loans that were granted between March 2007 and March 2010, 386 were repaid
(including early repayments) and 310 defaulted by the end of December 2010.
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indicating the installment at which a default occurred. Let f(t) denote the probability dis-
tribution function of T and F(t) denote the cumulative probability function describing the
probability that T ≤t. Let S(t) denote the survival function of T describing the probability
that default occurs at some time after month t. Essentially, the survival function shows the
probability that a borrower serves the debt for at least t months. The relationship of S(t) to
f(t) is straightforward: S(t) = Pr(T >t) = 1−F(t) = 1−å
T
t=1 f(t).
Now, denote the conditional probability that a default occurs in month t conditional on
theprobabilitythatthedebt was timelyserved duringt−1 months,as h(t). Thisconditional
probabilityis knownas thediscrete-timehazard rate and is linkedto the survivalprobability
in the following way




As shown by Jenkins (1995), h(t) can be estimated using conventional estimation methods
for binary response variables. In order to do so, the data are organized such that the unit
20of observation is the monthly payment and not a loan. Each loan contributes as many
observations to the data set as there are monthly payments done by a borrower to repay the
loan.
Deﬁne a new binary indicator variable yit with yit = 1 if loan i defaults in month t and
yit = 0 otherwise. Note that Pr(yit = 1|T ≥ t) = Pr[T = t|T ≥ t] = hi(t). Hence, log-












All that is needed now to estimate the hazard rate is a functional speciﬁcation of h(t).
The most commonly used speciﬁcation is the logistic hazard function (Cox, 1972; Jenkins,
1995). Logistic distribution of the hazard rate implies that h(t) can be estimated by means





Time dependence of the hazard rate is operationalized by including a logarithmic function
of time, a1ln(t) into the model. Such speciﬁcation of duration dependence implies a mono-
tonically decreasing hazard if a1 < 0, a monotonically increasing hazard if a1 > 0, and a
constant hazard if a1 = 0. The effect of observable characteristics included in vector X is
captured in parameters’ vector b. Vector X includes the following variables: raised loan
amount (divided by 250), offered interest rate in % p.a., loan duration, loan purpose, bor-
rower’s Schufa-rating with "A" being the best grade, ﬁnancial burden, employment status,
age, gender, place of residence, loan vintage (year and quarter when the ﬁrst payment is
due) and calendar month of payment to capture seasonality effects. Note that only observa-
tions on approved loans can be used to estimate equation 4. Estimation results are reported
in Table 1. According to the results, ˆ a1 = −0.150. Thus, ˆ h(t|X) decreases with the time.
Table 1: Estimation results after discrete-time hazard model
Coeff. St.Error
Raised amount 0.009*** (0.00)
Offered interest rate 0.166*** (0.04)
Loan duration
36 months (ref.)



























Aus- & Weiterbildung -0.001 (0.37)
Auto & Motorrad 0.301 (0.21)
Familie & Erziehung -0.051 (0.24)
Feierlichkeiten & besondere Anlässe -0.290 (0.52)
Geschäftserweiterung -0.439 (0.38)
Gesundheit & Lifestyle -0.027 (0.44)
Gewerblicher Kreditbedarf -0.358 (0.46)
Haus, Garten, Heimwerken (ref.)
Investition -0.402 (0.66)
Liquidität 0.158 (0.26)
Reisen & Urlaub -0.268 (0.48)
Sammeln & Seltenes
Sonstiges 0.297 (0.21)
Sport & Freizeit 0.380 (0.38)
Tierwelt 0.847** (0.42)
Umschuldung 0.088 (0.25)

















































* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
(ref.) = reference category
Using the vector of estimated coefﬁcients, I calculate for each loan application posted
at the platform (not only the approved ones) its individual hazard function, ˆ hl(t). Based on
the determined hazard function, the survival function ˆ Sl(t) and the probability distribution










1− ˆ Sl(t), if t = 1
ˆ Sl(t −1)− ˆ Sl(t), if t > 1.
The sample means for the hazard, survival and probability distribution functions are plotted
in Figure 2. Estimated probability distribution function of loan l, ˆ fl(t), is used to determine





ˆ fl(t), ∀t < M+1
1−å
M
t=1 ˆ fl(t), if t = M+1.
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24Figures and Tables
Figure 3: Loans procured at Smava
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25Figure 5: Possible outcomes of investment in a loan with duration 36 months
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27Table 2: KDF-Indicator
KDF-Indikator Debt-to-disposable income ratio
1 0 bis 20%
2 20 bis 40%
3 40 bis 60%
4 60 bis 67%
Table 3: Creditworthiness rating grades and corresponding PDs
This table shows the rating grades that eligible individuals to borrow at the platform. The rating grades are assigned to borrowers
by the German national credit bureau Schufa. Each rating grade reﬂects the probability of a borrower’s default given his past credit
behavior and current debt obligations.










Table 4: Historical payment rates in pools
This table shows the predicted and the historical average payment rate for each of the 16 pools. The historical average is calculated
over the period from April 2007 to January 2010. Source: http://www.smava.de.
Loans with duration 36 months
A B C D E F G H
Predicted payment rate 98.8 97.8 96.6 96.1 95.1 93.7 90.6 87.1
Historical average 97.4 95.8 98.4 95.6 95.9 92.4 92.0 89.7
Loans with duration 60 months
A B C D E F G H
Predicted payment rate 98.5 97.4 95.8 95.4 94.2 92.4 88.8 84.6
Historical average 99.5 97.8 98.5 91.5 95.2 94.2 85.9 84.1
28Table 5: Summary statistics of selected variables by investors’ gender
Males Females
N=5,046 N=625
Variable Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. t-Test p-value
Age 41 12.32 45 12.50 -6.31 0.00
Duration of participation 14 8.72 13 7.80 3.81 0.00
# of submitted orders 10 16 8 12 2.24 0.02
Order value, in e 469 372 481 391 -0.80 0.42
Total amount invested 4,436 8456 4,004 7165 1.74 0.25
Table 6: Deﬁnition of explanatory variables
Variable Name Description
Investor-speciﬁc characteristics
Female = 1 if investor is female, = 0 otherwise
Loan-speciﬁc characteristics
E(Return) Expected rate of return to investment, in % p.a.
SD(Return) Standard deviation of the expected rate of return form investment
Amounta Requested loan amount, in e.
Duration=60 months Dummy variable = 1 if loan duration is 60 months, = 0 if 36 months
Offered interest rate Offered nominal annual interest rate, in %
Purpose =1 if business loan, =0 if consumer loan
Description Length of description of loan purpose, in # of characters
Borrower-speciﬁc characteristics
Age Age in years
Female = 1 if borrower is female, = 0 if male
Rating measures borrowers’ creditworthiness, takes 8 values from A (best)
to H (worst)
Financial burden: low = 1 if borrower’s debt-to-income ratio does not exceed 20% and 0
otherwise
Financial burden: moderate =1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within the range 20-40% and 0 oth-
erwise
Financial burden: substantial =1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within the range 40-60% and 0 oth-
erwise
Financial burden: high =1 if debt-to-income ratio lies within the range 60-67% and 0 oth-
erwise
Employment =1 if borrower is self-employed 0 if employed or retired
a Since the value is always a multiple of 250, the variable is scaled by factor 1
250 when used in regressions
29Table 7: Estimation results after mixed logit regression
S1 S2 S3
Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error
ˆ b b b
E[Return] 0.790*** (0.01) 0.599*** (0.01) 0.614*** (0.01)
SD[Return] -0.267*** (0.01) -0.179*** (0.02) -0.176*** (0.02)
Rating -0.520*** (0.01) -0.519*** (0.01)
Loan duration: 36 months (ref.)
60 months -1.067*** (0.03) -1.045*** (0.03)
ln(Amount) -0.512*** (0.01) -0.523*** (0.01)
Description 0.201*** (0.01) 0.198*** (0.01)
Offered interest rate 0.405*** (0.01) 0.400*** (0.01)
Loan purpose: consumer loan (ref.)
business loan 0.095*** (0.02) 0.110*** (0.02)
Employment: employed or retired (ref.)
self-employed 0.354*** (0.01) 0.350*** (0.01)
Age -0.006*** (0.00) -0.006*** (0.00)
Financial burden: low (ref.)
moderate 0.396*** (0.02) 0.407*** (0.02)
substantial 0.541*** (0.02) 0.554*** (0.02)
high 0.618*** (0.03) 0.624*** (0.03)
Borrower gender: male (ref.)
female -0.096*** (0.01) -0.094*** (0.01)
ˆ s s sb
E[Return] 0.528*** (0.01) 0.544*** (0.01) 0.533*** (0.01)
SD[Return] 0.479*** (0.01) 0.195*** (0.01) 0.199*** (0.01)
Rating 0.188*** (0.01) 0.198*** (0.01)
Loan duration: 36 months (ref.)
60 months 1.404*** (0.03) 1.377*** (0.03)
ln(Amount) 0.264*** (0.02) 0.251*** (0.02)
Description 0.096*** (0.02) 0.064** (0.03)
Offered interest rate 0.054*** (0.01) 0.022** (0.01)
Loan purpose: consumer loan (ref.)
business loan 0.008 (0.04) 0.013 (0.04)
Employment: employed or retired (ref.)
self-employed 0.041* (0.02) 0.048** (0.02)
Age 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00)
Financial burden: low (ref.)
moderate 0.021 (0.03) 0.027 (0.03)
substantial 0.003 (0.02) 0.016 (0.02)
high 0.135*** (0.03) 0.116*** (0.03)
Borrower gender: male (ref.)
female 0.004 (0.02) 0.011 (0.02)




Loan duration: 36 months (ref.)
60 months -0.209** (0.10)
ln(Amount) 0.056 (0.04)
Description 0.001 (0.02)
Offered interest rate 0.028 (0.04)
Loan purpose: consumer loan (ref.)
business loan -0.139* (0.08)
Employment: employed or retired (ref.)
self-employed 0.021 (0.05)
Age 0.003** (0.00)




Borrower gender: male (ref.)
female 0.016 (0.05)
Log-likelihood -99629 -89021 -89013
N 931271 931271 931271
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; (ref.) = reference category
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